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2Introduction 
State Medicaid agencies are under 
particular scrutiny as health care costs 
continue to rise and the need for 
Medicaid-funded health care services for 
increasing eligible populations far exceeds 
available funding. This scrutiny will only 
intensify given the impact of the economic 
downturn on state revenues. Commercial 
payers face the same health care cost 
increases and deal with cost-shifting as 
providers seek higher reimbursement to 
make up for lower public program rates 
and care for the uninsured. Taxpayer 
tolerance for additional public program 
funding is limited, and the state funding 
shortfall will widen when the federally 
mandated Medicaid expansion takes effect 
in 2014, even with the federal government 
taking on the majority of the costs for 
the newly eligible. Medicaid agencies 
are particularly challenged by the costs 
of serving the elderly and people with 
disabilities, who account for over half of 
Medicaid expenditures.1 This population 
will continue to increase due to U.S. 
population age trends.
Effectively managing health care cost 
increases involves addressing challenges 
inherent in the entire health care system 
to ensure delivery of the right care, in 
the right amount, at the right time. 
The current system encourages volume 
over value, with little financial reward 
for improving outcomes or delivering 
preventive care. Hospitals’, physicians’, 
and other providers’ income depends on 
delivering more services to more people, 
which increases health care costs without 
any guarantee of improved outcomes. 
Consumers have little information about 
relative quality and appropriateness of care 
to guide them and, if insured, are often 
shielded from the actual costs of care.  
Many policymakers are taking a renewed 
look at Medicaid payment strategies to 
determine how to slow cost increases 
and incent providers to deliver more 
efficient and effective care to the growing 
number of beneficiaries. Two payment 
strategies, while not new in concept, have 
been promoted of late: global bundling 
(also referred to as risk-adjusted global 
fees and comprehensive care payment2) 
and episodic bundling. Recent federal 
legislation (The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, or ACA) promotes 
these strategies through Medicare and 
Medicaid. The new law authorizes 
implementation of Medicaid global and 
acute care episode bundled payment 
demonstration projects in selected 
states beginning in 2011. Medicare has 
already been experimenting with episodic 
payment approaches through various pilot 
programs, and the ACA requires Medicare 
to implement a national pilot program 
on bundled payment by 2013. This brief 
describes global and episodic bundling and 
outlines considerations for state Medicaid 
agencies when evaluating potential 
implementation, including the relevance 
of these strategies for Medicaid agencies 
employing managed care strategies.
Overview of Global 
and Episodic 
Bundling
Global and episodic bundling payment 
strategies are payment approaches under 
which a group of providers receives a 
set payment amount per patient for a 
predefined time period for a predefined 
set of services. Both strategies go beyond 
current bundling approaches as they 
include multiple providers and services. 
Current approaches, most notably 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) and 
ambulatory payment classifications 
(APCs), cover only hospital care.  
Under global bundling, a provider or group 
of providers receives a single payment per 
person to cover a wide range of services over 
a period of time (typically prorated over a 
year). Payment is risk-adjusted based on a 
patient’s health and other key characteristics, 
such as age and gender, that may affect the 
level of needed services. Strong outcome and 
performance measures are incorporated into 
the payment structure.  
Under episodic bundling, a provider 
or group of providers receives a single 
payment per person and health event 
(e.g., hip fracture or knee replacement), 
with payment adjusted for the severity of 
the presenting patient’s condition. The 
time period is more limited than in global 
bundling, lasting from the beginning of 
the health event to, in general, 30 days after 
the related hospital discharge. Although 
episodic bundling may include a wide 
range of providers and services—for 
example, hospitals, physicians, physical 
therapists, and long-term care facilities—it 
typically focuses on hospital and physician 
care along with some ancillary services.  
The differences among global bundling, 
episodic bundling, and historical provider 
capitation approaches have been the subject 
of much debate. For purposes of this paper, 
historical provider capitation refers to 
traditional capitated arrangements between 
payers and providers that typically do not 
include strong risk-adjustment features or 
performance/outcome measures.  The lack 
of risk adjustment under historical provider 
capitation meant that providers took on 
both insurance risk (the risk of whether 
or not a patient has an illness or condition 
requiring care) and performance risk (the 
ability of a provider to address an illness 
or condition in a high-quality and efficient 
manner). When historical provider capitation 
used risk adjustment, the approaches were 
What Is Bundling?
Bundling is the process of grouping services 
for payment purposes—either for a particular 
person over a predefined period of time or for 
a particular clinical diagnosis or procedure. 
Instead of providers receiving payment for 
each individual service performed, they 
receive one payment amount for a group of 
services related to either a particular person 
or a particular diagnosis or procedure.
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adjustment strategies currently used by some 
states to risk-adjust Medicaid capitation rates 
paid to managed care organizations (MCO) 
and (2) more recent commercial capitation 
strategies.  
Under historical provider capitation, 
providers made money if patients 
stayed healthy, but they did not receive 
additional revenue for taking on sicker 
patients. In addition, providers were paid 
regardless of quality of care and related 
outcomes. In contrast, global and episodic 
bundling strategies employ a strong risk-
adjustment component; the strategies 
call for payers to take on the insurance 
risk (the risk of whether a patient has an 
illness or condition requiring care) and 
for providers to assume responsibility 
for performance risk (the ability of a 
provider to address an illness or condition 
in a high-quality and efficient manner).3 
Global and episodic bundling also includes 
bonuses or penalties based on quality 
measurement. Figure 1 summarizes 
some of the key differences among global 
bundling, episodic bundling, and historical 
provider capitation models.
Global and episodic bundling strategies 
are not mutually exclusive, and episodic 
bundling does not necessarily precede 
global bundling as a building block. The 
two strategies serve different goals and 
therefore may be implemented either 
separately or together as a part of a larger 
service delivery strategy. For example, 
a state could use global bundling for 
care and management of individuals 
with chronic conditions in order to 
control avoidable hospitalizations but 
could use episodic bundling for labor 
and delivery care for pregnant women 
(including prenatal care) or for hip or 
knee replacements (including post-surgery 
recovery and therapy).  
While episodic bundling provides a tool 
for managing cost and the variation of 
costs across similar episodes, it may not 
discourage future episodes (e.g., the 
number of hospitalizations in a year for 
chronic disease patients) because the time 
period for payment is limited to the single 
episode. Accordingly, episodic bundling 
may be well suited to conditions in which 
the rate of occurrence of episodes is less of a 
concern, and there is unnecessary variation 
across different providers in the cost of an 
episode of care (e.g., labor and delivery). 
Global bundling, on the other hand, 
intends to affect the number of unnecessary 
episodes in addition to the cost of episodes. 
Global bundling may be particularly 
well suited for patients with conditions 
involving a high rate of hospitalizations and 
a potential for preventable re-admissions.  
Global and episodic bundling can 
both help reduce avoidable hospital re-
admissions—a key area for cost reduction 
and improved outcomes—albeit in 
different ways. Episodic bundling’s 
inclusion of a period of time after the 
health event for follow-up care—typically 
30 days—incents providers to reduce the 
number of re-admissions after the initial 
hospitalization so as to achieve net income. 
Global bundling’s structure of paying for 
all services for a longer time period covers 
all hospitalizations and re-admissions, not 
just those related to a particular health 
event.  Accordingly, providers have a 
similar incentive to reduce re-admissions, 
but that incentive is not tied to a specific 
health event.  
Example of an Episode of Care
Under Geisinger Health System’s ProvenCare 
program, payment is bundled for all 
non-emergency coronary artery bypass 
graft (CABG) procedures, including the 
pre-operative evaluation, all hospital and 
professional fees, and management of any 
complications (including re-admissions) 
occurring within 90 days of the procedure.
Figure 1:  Key Differences among Episodic Bundling, Global Bundling, and Historical  
Provider Capitation
Feature Episodic Bundling Global Bundling
Historical Provider 
Capitation
Time period Health event, including 
additional time to 
encompass related  
re-admissions 
One year, paid monthly 
or via fee-for-service with 
periodic reconciliation 
with global budget
One year, prorated by 
month
Target 
population
Tailored to each payer’s 
goals
Tailored to each payer’s 
goals
Tailored to each payer’s 
goals
Providers and 
services to be 
bundled
Services related to 
health event for a 
particular person 
•	 Hospital and  
physician services
•	 Other services and 
providers only as 
necessary to treat 
the health care event
All services related to 
care for a particular 
person (carve-outs  
may apply)
•			Hospital and physi-
cian services
•			All other services 
necessary to provide 
covered services 
All services related to care 
for a particular person 
(carve-outs may have 
applied)
•			Hospital and physician 
services (may have 
been capitated sepa-
rately)
•			All other services 
necessary to provide 
covered services 
Performance 
and outcome 
measures
Yes Yes Sometimes  
Risk-adjustment 
feature
Yes Yes Less sophisticated 
methods
Assignment of 
risk
Split between payer and 
provider
Split between payer and 
provider
Provider accepts financial 
risk
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can be useful in states already using 
managed care approaches to deliver care. 
Approximately 70 percent of Medicaid 
enrollees receive some or all of their 
care through some form of managed 
care.4 Typical Medicaid managed care 
arrangements include full-risk capitated 
contracts for all covered services; 
pre-paid, partial-risk contracts for a 
subset of services; and primary care 
case management (PCCM). PCCM is 
not capitation; the state pays Medicaid 
beneficiaries’ primary care physicians 
an administrative fee to provide basic 
care and to coordinate and authorize 
any needed specialty care or other 
services. States using PCCM may find 
global and episodic bundling strategies 
particularly helpful as PCCM primary 
care providers are typically not at risk 
for hospitalizations. States already using 
partial or full-risk capitation may achieve 
a more limited benefit from global or 
episodic bundling strategies as they 
already bundle services.
Generally speaking, under a global or 
episodic bundling approach, a Medicaid 
agency would contract directly with 
an integrated provider group (e.g., an 
accountable care organization [ACO]5 
or a hospital or hospital system that 
has either established employment 
relationships with physicians or entered 
into some other type of exclusive 
contractual arrangement with a physician 
group(s) for the majority of services). 
However, it is possible for Medicaid 
agencies that use MCOs or other similar 
clinically integrated entities to work 
through those entities to implement global 
or episodic bundling. We discuss this 
issue in more detail later under “Medicaid 
Considerations.”
Despite significant benefits to 
implementing a global or episodic 
bundling approach, Medicaid agencies 
and their contracted providers would 
require significant resources to do so. 
Medicaid agencies, for example, would 
need to restructure their provider or MCO 
contracts (or both), develop sophisticated 
analyses of utilization and costs across 
providers for specific populations and 
diagnoses, and employ a robust risk-
adjustment methodology. In global and 
episodic bundling approaches, payers also 
typically provide reports to providers as 
part of an ongoing feedback loop. These 
reports might include, for example, 
data on re-admission rates, emergency 
department utilization, and discretionary 
ambulatory procedures. Medicaid agencies, 
or the MCOs with which they contract, 
would need to develop this analytic 
capacity and work closely with providers 
to gain a common understanding of the 
results of the analyses.  
To be successful under global and episodic 
bundling, providers must be highly 
integrated.  Accordingly, Medicaid agencies 
might initially look to highly integrated 
provider systems, including emerging 
ACOs and other similar entities. There 
is also a recent trend across the country 
toward increased hospital and physician 
integration. A wide range of providers 
would need to perform population-
level care management jointly, predict 
and manage financial risk, and integrate 
service delivery. These activities would, 
for example, require all providers to use 
a common electronic medical record and 
perform “real-time” analyses of utilization 
and cost (as opposed to the “look back” 
approach that claims data provide). While 
the federal and state governments have 
made significant investments to improve 
health information technology, additional 
provider investment would be required to 
make the needed changes to information 
systems, including the use of electronic 
medical records.  
Medicaid Global 
Bundling Key 
Implementation 
Issues
When developing a global bundling 
approach, several key issues warrant 
consideration across payers:
•		Target population. While global 
bundling theoretically could, if 
appropriately tailored, be implemented 
for most populations, Medicaid 
agencies should first determine which 
covered populations could most benefit 
from increased coordination and 
integration of services. Detailed analysis 
of health care costs and utilization by 
subpopulation could help identify, 
for example, which populations have 
the most unexplained variance in 
health care costs and utilization across 
providers.  
•		Providers and services to be bundled. 
Current global and episodic bundling 
payment strategies typically include 
hospitals, physicians, and prescription 
drugs.  Depending on the covered 
services, the strategy might also include 
behavioral health, nursing facility 
care, home health, hospice, and other 
services. A payer could decide to pay 
for certain services and providers 
outside of the bundle. For example, 
similar to some current managed care 
approaches, Medicaid could include 
all acute care, primary care, behavioral 
health, and prescription drugs under a 
global payment and pay separately for 
extended long-term care services.    
•		Risk adjustment. Adjusting payments 
based on types of conditions, severity 
of conditions, and other characteristics 
of the patients cared for reduces the 
incentive for providers to avoid less 
healthy patients. Medicaid agencies  
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include in risk-adjusting payments and 
determine if the patient population is 
sufficient to diversify risk adequately. 
Risk adjustment has some notable 
limitations, however, as discussed later 
under “Medicaid Considerations.”
•		Payment levels.  If a global payment 
rate is set too low, providers may 
be incented to restrict needed care. 
However, a global payment rate 
should reflect a reduction in current 
expenditures resulting from improved 
outcomes and a more coordinated 
application of services and related 
resources. In this regard, careful 
analysis of historical expenditures and 
utilization data is necessary, along with 
a collaborative planning process with 
providers. Payment rates can be set, 
for example, by using the historical 
costs of services (e.g., average fee-for-
service rates minus a predetermined 
percent) or guideline-based standards 
(estimated costs of care determined by 
using a set of recommended services).6 
Medicaid agencies could consider 
using commercially available groupers 
to inform analyses and payment rate 
determination, although these may not 
fully address issues related to disability 
services (particularly developmental 
disability) and long-term care. The 
groupers use data such as diagnosis and 
procedural codes to assign individuals 
to predefined episodes of care or 
clinical risk groups. Given historical 
payment levels that reflect significant 
state budget constraints, Medicaid 
faces unique challenges when setting 
payment levels, as discussed later under 
“Medicaid Considerations.”  
•	 Distributing payments. In theory, a 
Medicaid agency (or its contracted 
MCO) would provide one global 
payment amount to a provider 
organization for services for a particular 
patient, and that provider organization 
would be responsible for distributing 
the payment as necessary to the 
individual providers responsible for care 
for the patient. Payment distribution 
has been a notable challenge to the 
global payment approach as few 
providers are integrated enough or have 
the administrative capacity and health 
information technology infrastructure 
necessary to accept and distribute 
payments, although physician and 
hospital integration is on the rise. As 
a result, it may be necessary to look at 
alternative payment administration 
arrangements. For example, according 
the Center for Healthcare Quality and 
Payment Reform, the Patient Choice 
system in Minnesota, which serves self-
funded employers, uses the standard 
fee-for-service claims payment system 
and adjusts fee levels based on the 
severity-adjusted total cost of care.7 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
(BCBSMA) pays providers in its global 
payment system (Alternative Quality 
Contract, or AQC) on a fee-for-
service basis until the end of the year, 
at which time BCBSMA performs a 
reconciliation with the predetermined 
global budget (based on total estimated 
medical expenses and adjusted for 
patient health status).  
•	 Building in safeguards for underutilization. 
As with traditional provider capitation, 
there is some concern that providers may 
skimp on care, particularly preventive 
services for improved outcomes that may 
not occur in the short term. In addition 
to developing severity-adjusted rates, 
other safeguards can be considered, 
including use of outlier payments, tying 
incentives or penalties to outcomes of 
care, requiring the delivery of specific 
services for payment to be received, and 
public reporting of quality measures.8 
For example, BCBSMA’s AQC includes 
performance-based incentives for a broad 
set of quality and outcome measures for 
ambulatory and inpatient care. By meeting 
defined targets on these measures, AQC 
organizations can earn up to an additional 
10 percent of their global budget. 
Implementing a global bundling 
payment approach requires a great 
deal of preparation, even for Medicaid 
agencies already familiar with capitation 
approaches. For example, a state Medicaid 
agency would need to: 
•		 Improve analytics to identify avoidable 
costs and complications by population 
and episode;
•		Assess provider networks’ ability to 
reduce avoidable costs and increase 
quality through the use of health care 
information technology and clinical 
protocols;
 •		Determine how state health 
information technology strategies 
may be modified to support providers’ 
efforts to integrate and coordinate care, 
particularly the implementation of 
electronic medical records; and
•		Develop or strengthen pay-for-
performance approaches, for example, 
public reporting of quality-of-care 
indicators.
As with other payment strategies, Medicaid 
agencies can tailor the global bundling 
concept to ease implementation and allow 
providers time to adjust to the new payment 
system. For example, states could consider 
implementing a physician practice–specific 
global payment with performance incentives 
for hospital services9 similar to partial 
capitation. Under such a strategy, a physician 
practice or health system would receive a 
single severity-adjusted payment per patient 
to cover services provided through that 
practice or system. Other outpatient and 
inpatient hospital services would be paid 
separately, but the practice or system would 
receive a pay-for-performance-style bonus or 
penalty based on the level of utilization of all 
outpatient and inpatient services. 
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to Date
While global bundling has not been widely 
implemented, two large commercial 
payers have implemented it, and the ACA 
authorizes Medicaid global payment pilot 
projects for states (see box above).  
 
Medicaid Episodic 
Bundling Key 
Implementation Issues
As with global bundling, some of the key 
issues associated with episodic bundling 
include defining the target population, 
identifying included providers and 
services, selecting a risk-adjustment 
approach, determining payment levels, and 
administering payments. Episodic providers 
and services may be more limited than 
global bundling providers as the former are 
identified on the basis of the particular type 
of services required for the chosen health 
care event. Determining payment levels may 
require a different type of analysis than that 
required for global payments because of the 
desirability of developing a payment rate 
based on a specific protocol of care for the 
particular episode. For example, Geisinger 
Health System bases its payment rates for 
cardiac surgery episodes of care on 40 best-
practice steps developed from the American 
Heart Association and the American College 
of Cardiology guidelines for cardiac surgery.  
Additional issues pertaining to episodic 
bundling include the following:
•		Establishing period of time covered. 
It is necessary to establish a clear 
beginning and end to each episode of 
care so that providers’ responsibilities 
within the fixed payment are clear. For 
example, when bundling services for 
an episode that would typically require 
inpatient hospitalization (e.g., knee 
replacement surgery), decisions must 
be made regarding how long after the 
procedure services will be provided 
under the bundled payment and if they 
will include subacute care facilities and 
physical therapists for rehabilitation 
needs and physician follow-up visits.  
•		 Identifying diagnoses or clinical 
procedures. Episodes of care hinge on 
specific health events, which may be 
defined by using diagnoses and/or 
procedure codes. 
•		Use of clinical protocols and quality-
of-care standards. Basing payment 
on established clinical protocols and 
guidelines for the specific episodes of 
care and providing such information 
to providers assists them in improving 
quality of care and reducing unnecessary 
costs (e.g., Geisinger’s 40 best-practice 
steps).
As with global bundling, preparation for 
an episodic bundling payment strategy 
requires state Medicaid agencies to 
perform sophisticated analyses of patient 
expenditures and utilization (specifically by 
episode of care), analyze current provider 
networks, support health care information 
technology innovations, and strengthen 
pay-for-performance measurement/
recognition approaches.  
Implementation of Episodic 
Bundling to Date
Episodic bundling approaches have been 
tested more than global bundling approaches, 
although primarily for services largely 
requiring hospital and physician services. 
Current Examples of Global Bundling Approaches
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBSMA) Alternative 
Quality Contract (AQC)  
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts uses a per-patient global budget (based on total 
estimated medical expenses adjusted for patient health status) with significant performance 
incentives based on quality measures for its health maintenance organization product. The 
AQC covers all services and costs (primary care, inpatient, outpatient, pharmacy, behavioral 
health, among others), with participating providers paid on a fee--for-service basis until the 
end of the year, at which time BCBSMA performs reconciliation with the predetermined 
global budget. Provider participation is voluntary, and BCBSMA offers different levels of risk- 
sharing arrangements with provider organizations according to the size of the group, the 
degree of integration, and the ability to assume risk for utilization and variations in care.
Source: Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts  
The Alternative Quality Contract. May 2010. Available online (October 14, 2010) at  www.qualityaffordability.com/pdf/
alternative-quality-contract.pdf.   
Patient Choice Care System 
The Patient Choice Care System groups health care providers and facilities into customized 
networks called Care Systems and is available to self-funded employers in Minnesota, South 
Dakota, and limited areas of North Dakota and western Wisconsin. The Care Systems are 
tiered into three cost groups based on their risk-adjusted total cost of care combined with 
their performance on a variety of quality and efficiency measures. Employers offer a choice of 
Care Systems, and consumers have access to comparative information as well as the option 
to contribute less toward the cost of their premium when selecting Care Systems in lower 
tiers. Once enrolled, participants obtain care from providers affiliated with their selected Care 
System in order to be eligible for in-network benefits. According to the Center for Healthcare 
Quality and Payment Reform, Patient Choice pays providers the equivalent of a global 
bundled payment by using its standard fee-for-service claims payment system and adjusting 
fee levels based on the severity-adjusted total cost of care. 
Sources: Patient Choice Web site. Available online (December 31, 2010) at www.patientchoicehealthcare.com/physicians/
products.html; Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform. Transitioning to Comprehensive Care Payment. 
Available online (December 20, 2010) at www.chqr.org/downloads/TransitioningtoComprehensiveCarePayment.pdf.
Medicaid
The ACA authorizes the implementation of a state global payment demonstration project 
for up to five states that would adjust the current Medicaid payment structure for safety-net 
hospitals from fee-for-service to capitated payment (PPACA, Section 2705). As of February 
2011, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation had not released guidance on the 
projects, and it is not known which states will pursue this option.
7The box at right describes different episodic 
bundling approaches in effect or to be 
implemented in the near future.
Medicaid 
Considerations
Medicaid agencies face additional 
challenges when considering global or 
episodic bundling approaches. Given the 
amount of resources that state Medicaid 
agencies and providers would need to 
dedicate to the successful implementation 
and ongoing use of either strategy, 
Medicaid agencies will need to identify 
populations and/or health events that 
clearly offer opportunities for reasonably 
achievable improvements in costs and 
outcomes. Even in these cases, it may be 
prudent for a state to consider if its current 
payment approach may be modified 
to achieve similar cost and outcome 
improvements (particularly if full- or 
partial-risk capitation is already used). 
Starting on a smaller scale through pilot 
programs may help Medicaid agencies 
determine how best to structure global 
or episodic payment approaches and 
assess to what extent providers are able to 
coordinate and effectively manage the risk. 
Impact of State Budget Constraints 
on Setting Payment Levels
Often Medicaid agencies aim to maintain 
budget neutrality when changing payment 
strategies.  As many providers already 
perceive that Medicaid rates are too low,  
Global Bundling Issues That 
Apply to Episodic Bundling
•	Defining the target population
•	Identifying included providers and 
services
•	Selecting a risk-adjustment approach
•	Determining payment levels
•	Administering payments
(Refer to Medicaid Global Bundling Key Implementation 
Issues section for more details about these issues.)
Examples of Current Episodic Bundling Approaches
Provider Groups or Commercial Payers
•		Geisinger Health System in Pennsylvania’s ProvenCare. ProvenCare offers one bundled 
payment for all non-emergency coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) procedures, including 
the pre-operative evaluation, all hospital and professional fees, and management of any 
complications (including re-admissions) occurring within 90 days of the procedure. Proven-
Care now also includes bundled payments for hip replacement and cataract surgery, among 
other services.
•		Carol, The Care Marketplace, a for-profit company in Minnesota. This employer-sponsored 
program offers employees 53 care packages designed around four chronic conditions (pe-
diatric asthma, chronic low back pain, coronary artery disease, and Type 2 diabetes). Care 
packages are evidence-based and include traditional outpatient services, along with some 
non-traditional services. Participating providers set their own prices for the care packages, 
and employers decide how much coverage they will provide under their existing benefit 
plans for each care package. 
•		 The Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA). IHA began work on an episodic bundling pilot 
in 2010 for total knee and hip replacements in Southern California and is now expanding 
the program to providers across California and other clinical areas and episodes of acute 
treatment that may include surgical procedures. IHA was awarded a three-year, $2.9 million 
grant from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in September 2010 to 
demonstrate bundled episode payments for physicians, hospitals, and other providers and 
to evaluate their effectiveness versus current payment methods in California.
•		PROMETHEUS. Payers such as Health Partners in Minnesota, Independence Blue Cross 
(Pennsylvania) in partnership with the Crozer-Keystone Health System, and the Employers 
Coalition on Health in Illinois are using the PROMETHEUS payment model. Under the mod-
el, providers are paid evidence-informed case rates (ECR) to care for a patient diagnosed 
with a single condition. The ECR is a single, risk-adjusted payment—based on historical 
information from a large commercially insured population database—that covers health care 
services delivered in both inpatient and outpatient hospital settings. 
Medicare 
Acute Care Episode Demonstration. The project began 2009 and now includes five sites tar-
geting orthopedic and cardiovascular services. Medicare will continue testing episode-of-care 
approaches; the ACA authorizes a five-year, national, voluntary pilot program starting in 2013 
that includes hospital services, physician services, and post-acute care services for an episode 
of care that begins 3 days before hospitalization and extends for 30 days following discharge. 
Medicaid and Other Publicly Developed Approaches 
•		Minnesota’s Department of Health is developing seven baskets of care—collections of 
health care services—designed to treat particular health conditions or episodes of care. The 
baskets of care include quality measures and are aimed at addressing asthma (children), 
diabetes, low back pain, obstetric care, preventive care (adults and children), and total knee 
replacement. Although providers and payers (including Medicaid and Medicare) are not re-
quired to use baskets of care, the objective of the baskets-of-care concept is to encourage 
providers, payers, and consumers to be innovative and think differently about health care 
service delivery.
•		 The ACA authorizes the implementation of an integrated care hospitalization demonstration 
for up to eight states to use bundled payments to promote integrated care (PPACA, Sec-
tion 2704). As of February 2011, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation had not 
released guidance for the projects, and it is not known which states may pursue this option.
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if providers must invest additional resources 
in coordinating care and developing 
their health care information technology 
infrastructure, especially with additional 
cuts in states’ Medicaid funding on the 
horizon. State policymakers will need to 
assess carefully whether payment levels 
would appropriately meet the additional 
upfront and ongoing resources expended by 
providers, even when considering increased 
efficiencies and improved outcomes 
associated with provider integration and 
coordination. Medicaid agencies may want 
to consider conducting a program-wide 
assessment of payment levels to identify 
how Medicaid might adjust payment levels 
across service types to meet state goals and 
provider needs. 
Given funding constraints, it may be 
best to pilot global or episodic bundling 
approaches through existing integrated 
provider organizations; such organizations 
will likely have already made many of the 
changes needed to help ensure success 
under a global or episodic bundling 
approach (e.g., use of electronic medical 
records). Some Medicaid agencies may 
find that there is already a movement 
by providers to create ACOs or other 
clinically integrated entities and that these 
providers may be interested in exploring 
Medicaid pilot programs.
Coordinating with Other Payers 
Public payers have limited influence on the 
extent to which providers are sufficiently 
integrated to coordinate care at the level 
required by episodic and global bundling. 
While Medicaid will represent a much 
larger share of the health care market 
in 2014 under the ACA provisions for 
Medicaid coverage expansion, Medicaid 
agencies may need to be aware of what 
other payers are doing to make sure that 
the incentives they create are consistent 
with and do not conflict with those of 
other payers.  
Limitations of Risk Adjustment
One of the main benefits of global 
bundling is its emphasis on risk 
adjustment, which in theory should allow 
providers and payers to share risk more 
equitably. For many years, Medicaid 
agencies have been using and refining 
their Medicaid or condition-based risk-
adjustment systems for Medicaid risk-
based managed care—for example, the 
University of California’s Chronic Illness 
and Disability Payment System (CDPS) 
and Johns Hopkins University’s Adjusted 
Clinical Groups (ACG). Nonetheless, risk-
adjustment methodologies, while much 
improved over the last two decades, are 
still a work in progress, and even the most 
sophisticated approach explains only a 
portion of the risk. Medicaid agencies and 
providers should consider this an area of 
particular focus, given the risk to which 
Medicaid and their contracted providers 
are exposed. Some solutions to address 
the limitations with risk adjustment 
might include stop-loss payments, outlier 
payments, or reinsurance.10  
Should risk-adjustment approaches 
prove insufficient, providers may end up 
taking on more risk than they expected, 
potentially resulting in significant financial 
hardships for providers and potential 
disruption to provider networks for 
beneficiaries. The risks may be higher 
for Medicaid populations than for 
commercial populations, given some of 
the unique characteristics of Medicaid 
programs (discussed above) as well as 
the regulations governing how Medicaid 
patients can or cannot be billed for 
services, ease of communication (i.e., 
reading levels, transient nature of covered 
individuals, and so forth), and patient 
compliance. Medicaid agencies should 
carefully monitor the extent to which 
providers take on risk and develop their 
own assessment of whether the amount 
of risk is excessive (even if the provider is 
willing to move forward). Depending on 
how the provider accepts risk, Medicaid 
agencies may want to open discussions 
with the state insurance department to 
make sure that proper oversight is in 
place. Given the above concerns, it may be 
particularly important to start with small 
pilot programs that carefully analyze how 
the payment structure affects providers.
Considerations for States Using 
MCOs to Deliver Care 
Many states already use MCOs to 
provide services to the majority of 
their beneficiaries. The feasibility and 
palatability of states promoting global 
and episodic bundling strategies through 
these MCOs depend in large part on 
the goals of the state and insurance and 
provider market characteristics (e.g., 
number of integrated health systems in 
the state, number of insurers in the state, 
and whether they already contract with 
Medicaid).  
States could require MCOs to implement 
global or episodic bundling strategies as a 
condition of doing business with the state 
(using request-for-proposal and contract 
requirements) and then oversee those 
strategies. However, such a requirement 
could conflict with existing goals of using 
MCOs to reduce the state administrative 
burden as well as with reluctance to dictate 
internal reimbursement strategies to 
MCOs.  
Alternatively, states could choose to 
provide start-up funds for plans to 
implement pilot programs, offer extra 
points during the MCO proposal review 
process to MCOs that implement these 
strategies, or offer enhanced MCO 
payments for implementation. Using 
global or episodic bundling strategies 
could also be built into a state’s pay-
for-performance initiative with MCOs.  
Maine, for example, is planning to issue a 
managed care request for proposals in May 
State Demonstrations to 
Integrate Care for Dual Eligibles
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services plans to award contracts to up to 15 
states of up to $1 million each to implement 
a demonstration program that would 
improve the quality, coordination, and cost-
effectiveness of care for dual eligibles. The 
federal government particularly encourages 
the testing of new and emerging models 
(e.g., health homes or ACOs) and building 
on existing vehicles (e.g., PACE or SNP). 
State applications were due on February 1, 
2011, with implementation beginning after an 
18-month design period.
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that develop contracts with providers to 
move in the direction of severity-weighted 
capitated payments or shared risk.  
In states where the health plans that serve 
Medicaid recipients offer a wide variety 
of products and command a large market 
share, Medicaid agencies may have a 
particularly useful opportunity for cross-
payer coordination of global and episodic 
bundling approaches. States might also 
consider implementing episodic bundling 
strategies in geographic areas where 
traditional capitation has not been possible.
Relevance of Global and Episodic 
Bundling Strategies for the Elderly 
and People with Disabilities 
States’ service delivery systems for the 
elderly and people with disabilities vary 
widely, e.g., available funding, number 
and size of community-based service 
networks, and the integration of care 
between Medicare and Medicaid for dual 
eligibles (individuals qualifying under both 
programs). Whether a state uses global or 
episodic bundling for these populations 
should be considered within the context 
of existing delivery systems. For example, 
in the case of dual eligibles, fundamental 
administrative and payment policy changes 
to integrate Medicare and Medicaid 
services would likely need to take place 
before implementing bundled payment 
methodologies.  
Global bundling may hold particular 
promise as compared with episodic 
bundling for the elderly and people with 
disabilities due to the likelihood that 
these individuals have several diagnoses 
or needs. Dual eligibles, for example, are 
more likely to have mental health needs 
and to live in nursing homes compared 
with other Medicare beneficiaries.11 Under 
global bundling, providers would be 
responsible for all the needs of a patient, 
whereas episodic bundling would focus on 
a particular health event.   
The PACE model—which provides dual 
eligibles with all needed Medicare and 
Medicaid supportive services for a per 
member per month capitation rate from 
Medicare and Medicaid—is similar to 
global bundling and has often been held up 
as an example of well-executed integration 
between payers and providers. States could 
choose to build on this approach but 
expand it to a broader population.
Some states contract with Special Needs 
Plans (SNP) for Medicaid acute and 
long-term supports and services.12 The 
Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) increased 
SNP integration by requiring new plans or 
those expanding into new service areas to 
contract with state Medicaid agencies and 
establish new standards in the provision of 
care.13  States using SNPs for a full range of 
services could consider global bundling for 
all or a portion of these services or episodic 
bundling for specific events. Before 
using this approach, however, Medicaid 
agencies should carefully assess the degree 
to which SNPs fully integrate Medicare 
and Medicaid funding within their own 
administrative structure.  
Medicaid agencies might also want to 
consider serving as the integrated entity 
for delivering care to dual eligibles. 
This is a new model under which the 
Medicaid program would receive an 
agreed-upon amount of Medicare 
funding for participating dual eligibles 
and would assume responsibility for the 
Medicare benefit. States would be able 
either to manage the integrated benefit 
themselves or establish contracts or 
other arrangements with health plans or 
administrative entities to do so. States 
could choose to integrate global or episodic 
bundling strategies into this model.  
Dually eligible populations will quickly 
increase as the 80 million baby boomers 
become eligible. Advanced Medicaid 
planning, including new payment 
methodologies, is critical given the 
disproportionate costs associated with the 
co-morbidities inherent in this population. 
The challenges of modifying payments to 
care for this population will be significantly 
complex.
Options for States Not Moving 
Immediately to Global or Episodic 
Bundling
Depending on state-specific goals, the 
provider market, current Medicaid 
payment approaches, or available 
resources, some Medicaid agencies may 
not immediately implement global or 
episodic bundling approaches. Many 
options are available to these states to move 
toward increased bundling while achieving 
cost savings. For example, for acute care 
services, states could choose to implement 
the following:
•		Enhanced payments to hospitals that 
demonstrate reductions in avoidable re-
admissions. Similar to DRGs, enhanced 
payments help reduce re-admissions and 
produce real cost savings. With many re-
admissions generated by events outside 
of the hospital in ambulatory settings, 
an investment in transition coordinators 
may be critical. If payment increases 
are available for improvements and/or 
if grants are available for interventions, 
then there is an increased likelihood 
that hospitals will focus resources on 
care improvement and cost reduction 
resulting from reduced re-admissions. 
As states begin to focus on medical 
homes and other patient-centered 
approaches, they will also find that the 
transition of care coordination required 
to reduce re-admissions will be an 
important resource for enhancing care 
coordination of patients with chronic 
conditions and their care teams.    
•		 Increasing bundling in current inpatient 
and outpatient hospital reimbursement 
systems. For example, Medicaid could 
transition to Medicare’s risk-adjusted All 
Patient Refined DRGs or other similar 
products for inpatient hospital services 
or to Enhanced Ambulatory Patient 
Groups (EAPG) for outpatient hospital 
services, which is more bundled than 
Medicare’s APCs.
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•		 Increases in the time period around 
payment for specific DRG. For example, 
bundling could be increased over time, 
e.g., implement Medicare’s 72-hour 
window payment policies.14
•		Reducing or eliminating payment for the 
treatment of preventable complications.  
In going beyond ACA’s requirements 
that states do not pay for certain 
hospital-acquired conditions, state 
Medicaid agencies, for example, could 
adopt ACA’s provision that reduces 
Medicare payments to hospitals for 
preventable re-admissions.
Conclusion
Variations on global and episodic bundling 
strategies are likely to become more 
common in the future, and states are well 
advised to consider how their features 
may help provide higher-quality care to 
the sharply rising number of Medicaid 
enrollees. The provider landscape is also 
shifting, with a recent and notable trend 
across the country toward increased 
hospital and physician integration. Given 
these trends, pilot programs targeting 
areas where current analyses of cost and 
utilization suggest positive results may 
be particularly useful in determining if 
an expanded use of these strategies is 
warranted.  
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